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Abstract 
The parallel development of management theory and practice over three phases of economic 
development is surveyed; (1) the pre-oil crisis  experience 1969-1975, (2) the post oil crisis 
sobering up through most of the 1990s and (3) the emergence of new global production 
organizations , blurring the notion of the firm to be managed. The external market 
circumstances of each period dictate  different structures of business operations ; (a) a steady 
state and predictable environment, (b) crisis, inflation and disorderly markets and (c) new 
technology supporting a globally distributed production organization. As a consequence 
structural learning between the periods has been of limited value and often outright 
misleading.  
The influence of management theory on management practice and its origin in the received 
economic equilibrium model are discussed, and an alternative management theory based on 
the theory of the Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE)  presented. The increased rate of 
failure among large firms is related to the increasing complexity of business decisions in  
globally distributed production  and the decreased reliability of learning . It is concluded that 
successful management practice develops through experimentation in markets and that the 
best management education has been a varied career in many lines of business and in several 
companies.  
Key words: Competence bloc theory, Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE), 
Management theory, WAD theory, Firm Dynamics, Learning. 
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1. Background 
Management theory and thinking has to be based on some ”theory” of the firm and the 
economy at large. A standard argument of economic thinkers of the not too distant past was 
that the internal economy of the firm was fully known and controllable and that new 
information technology would soon make the real economy around us fully transparent and 
accessible for analytical understanding, optimization of individual and aggregate behavior, 
and the circumstances perfectly arranged for informed central planning. Such were the 
predictions of neo- walrasian analysts and their derived believers in management science and 
the business world (Eliasson 1976). ”Planning has become a fashionable subject in American 
management literature” writes Loasby (1967). Strategic models of management developed 
during the 1960s saw steady growth as the central objective to be achieved through market 
expansion and /or product differentiation, but mainly through organic growth (Ansoff 1965). 
These models were based on the Walras- Arrow-Debreu (WAD) static equilibrium model, the 
assumption that knowledge was identical to information, that information was an almost free 
resource and that the use of information required neither any particular competence nor any 
resource input. 
 
The parallel development of management theory and practice over three phases of economic 
development has been followed through interviews; (1) the pre-oil crisis experience 1969-
1975, (2) the post oil crisis sobering up period that lasted well into the 1990s and (3) the 
emergence of new global production organizations towards the end of the 1990s, blurring the 
notion of the firm to be managed. During the first period management theory based on the 
static WAD model of economics recommended central business economic planning based on 
analysis and forecasts (Eliasson 1976).  
 
Post oil crisis economic development in the 1970s was, however, a brutal experience for the 
central planners of firms. Their planning practice was mostly gone from the large business 
bureaucracies by the mid 1980s. Management theory had moved one step into what came to 
be called” strategic management” (Ansoff 1975,1978) emphasizing a turbulent and 
unpredictable environment and early warning methods. Porter (1980, 1985, 1990) reoriented 
literature somewhat by emphasizing economies of scale and international expansion to 
achieve competitive advantage, emphasizing costs but neglecting the role of creative 
processes (Brandes-Brege 1990). Management practice, however, changed ahead of literature 
and more radically. A new conception of the dynamics of the economy at large was mirrored 
in management practice of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The business world was seen as 
unpredictable or ”chaotic” and not to be made transparent by analytic methods using data 
from the past. In this Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE) management methods 
developed in practice were aimed at minimizing the economic consequences of unavoidable 
business mistakes. Business mistakes, therefore, had a significant learning content. 
Attempting to avoid them was synonymous to doing nothing in the EOE, and the most risky 
of all strategies. Since critical business competence is embodied in human beings top level 
management now took on an entirely new theoretical dimension, i. e. a shift away from the 
analytical approach and centrally conceived strategic directives towards working through 
people with creative capacity and operational competence and to discover and capture 
winning initiatives originating in the organization. Access to information and people with 
tacit competencies had become the key factor as reflected in business information systems 
(Eliasson 1984b, 1996a). Profitability was to be monitored centrally, but operations and even   3
initiatives could be delegated. A new, combined experimental and control mode, therefore, 
became typical management practice in the 1980s. There was, however, little guidance on 
how to do it neither from economic nor management theory. Quite in keeping with standard 
business and accounting theory the firm was , however, still regarded as a given and  
financially defined entity ( Eliasson 1996b, Eliasson-Eliasson 2002). 
 
On the verge of the New Millennium and a New Economy this assumption of a given 
hierarchy was, however, increasingly becoming a misconception. With intangible assets 
becoming the dominant capital endowment of advanced firms performance measurement and 
control became virtually impossible in some firms. With distributed global production 
becoming widespread and strategic acquisitions, reorganization and divestments becoming a 
common experimental mode of successful innovative firm development the whole notion of a 
given firm hierarchy to be controlled was becoming blurred. Even though a theory of the firm 
founded in Coase (1937) type contract and transaction cost analysis was beginning to take 
shape the production structure underlying the financial asset allocations was still assumed 
given. Thus, neither management nor economic theory had much guidance to offer and large 
advanced firms across the industrial world were beginning to experience failure on a larger 
scale than before. It appeared as if management experience from one period did not carry over 
to the next. Management learning from experience between periods was no longer a reliable 
transfer of knowledge and a management career within one firm an increasingly dangerous 
method of selecting people for the top competent teams of firms. While large firms had given 
up the demand of a broad based manufacturing experience for a career to the top in the 1980s 
and begun to increasingly recruit from a more narrow experience base in financial 
management new criteria for career recruitment clicked in during the 1990s. Even a varied 
internal career was no longer sufficient. A broadly based career within and between firms was 
increasingly found to be of critical importance (Eliasson 1990a, 1994, 1996a,c), but 
apparently too late to prevent large Swedish firms from getting into serious trouble. It had 
become more important than before to understand the nature of the knowledge or competence 
base to pass on between generations of managers.  
 
2. The  Problem 
Between 1969 and 1975 I carried out some 80 interviews of 60 US, European and Japanese 
firms (Eliasson 1976) on their internal information and control systems. Then it was all short-
term and long-range planning and a strong belief in a repetitive environment, forecasting and 
central ”analytic” leadership of standardized and well defined large scale production. The 
corporate planner made the strategic decisions, at least in management theory. Between 1975 
and 1995 I carried out an additional series of some 70 interviews with 50 firms, several of 
them the same as in the earlier interview series, and also some 15 firms that had attempted in 
the early 1980s to establish themselves in the then hot business information systems market 
(Eliasson 1984b,1996a). 
 
Two different intellectual worlds emerged. In 1970 it was all planning. In 1990 it was all 
decentralization, experiment, early warning, central profit control and access to information 
and people. 
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In between the two observation periods lay the great learning experience of the disorderly 
1970s boiling down to one important fact; there was little to learn in the 1990s from 
management practice in the early 1970s and the management methods used then had been of 
limited value in the 1960s, and probably misleading  
 
The late 1990s has seen the development of extensive distribution of product development 
and manufacturing over markets for specialist subcontractors and an increasing importance of 
strategic acquisitions, reorganizations and divestments to innovate large and small firms 
(Eliasson- Eliasson 2002). The endogenizing of the limits of the firm (Coase 1937) was 
thoroughly uprooting the notion of the firm as a given controllable hierarchy and requiring 
new approaches to management. During the first period mainstream economics offered 
guidance, although dangerously false guidance. During the second period the Austrian/ 
Schumpeterian theory of the EOE could have offered a nice theoretical foundation for 
management theorizing, but this theory was not ready at the  time 
2. For the third period of 
post Coasian (1937) industrial dynamics there was no theoretical guidance at hand, so we 
have had to develop some for this paper. 
 
The bottom line of the new development in industrial organization has been the merge of 
computing and communications (C&C) technology. Distributed production, integrated by an 
often temporary systems coordination agent, notably globally distributed production, offers 
great systemic productivity gains, and radically changes the whole notion of a firm requiring  
new entrepreneurial and organizational competence of the large businesses to the extent that 
large firms were beginning to fail in their organizational attempts to adapt to the new 
competitive conditions of a New Economy ( Eliasson 1996b, Eliasson-Eliasson 2002). 
 
A comparison of management practices in the three periods, therefore, is interesting both 
theoretically, empirically and practically. It not only illustrates how dependent we all are on 
the intellectual fashions of the day, but also how difficult it is to successfully manage the 
extreme complexity of a large, globally distributed business organization. 
 
By the early 1970s many managers saw the world as predictable and locally (for the firm) 
plannable.  
 
By the early 1980s, a decade of disorderly market experience had suppressed that view, but 
the rapidly innovating C&C technology made many managers still believe that technology 
and universal business information systems would soon overcome the complexity and provide 
top level management with general and highly flexible information tools. 
I will demonstrate that the limited capacity for learning and knowledge transfer and the 
increased failure rate of large firms are straightforward predictions of the theory of the EOE. 
In fact, in the EOE there is no such thing as the invincible corporation of Schumpeter (1942) 
that survives for ever on routinized innovation. 
 
                                                 
2 It was rather developed on the basis of observations in the interviews for these studies  of the experimental  
economic process going on in the wake of the oil crises of the 1970s (Eliasson 2003b).    5
However, two additional problems related to the dynamics of micro (firm) and macro 
interaction in the EOE will be addressed: 
1.  The recurring phases of more or less chaotic (disorderly) market behavior where analytic 
management information and decision methods fail or are outright misleading , and 
2.  the fact that despite these shortcomings of individual agents´ intelligence capacity 
distribution of decisions over agents in markets is still the preferred and optimal  
production organization. 
By 1995 (Eliasson 1996a) managers had, however, learned again. At this time new C&C 
technologies had made the world around them  increasingly heterogeneous, complex and 
unpredictable. C&C technology had been constantly increasing managers´ capacity to gather, 
process and analyze information, but at the same time it was also constantly changing the 
nature of what actors had to be informed about, that is the internal business organization and 
its economic and technological environment. The total number of circumstances  necessary  
to be informed about may even be increasing at a faster rate than the new C&C technology 
allows us to learn about them (Eliasson 1999a). The paradoxical outcome is that we may be 
becoming relatively (and increasingly so) more ignorant (Information Paradox I below). Thus 
out goes reliance on detached analytical thinking in the executive quarters. In comes rational, 
experimental behavior in the Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE), restoring the 
Knightian (1921) distinction between uncertainty and risk. 
 
To derive the management theory from which such rational behavior can be characterized we 
first introduce the characteristics of the EOE to derive the particular problems of information 
processing a manager in such an economy has to face.  
 
3.  The Experimental Nature of Economic Behavior 
The manager of each firm would prefer to look forward to a long and successful business life 
without having to seriously face the hazards of the real business world. Is there a fixture 
submerged under the violent seas of market life on which real managers can reliably navigate 
that a good manager with access to modern C&C technologies should be able to uncover? 
Such is the presumption of the standard neo- walrasian economic model, still being embraced 
by most economists, still being the foundation of modern finance theory, once being 
unknowingly embraced by the scientific management movement and by the strategic planners 
of large corporations in the West during the 1960s, and, not to forget, by many corporate 
executives. The answer in Eliasson-Sharefkin-Ysander (1983) was no, and part of this essay is 
devoted to explaining why this has to be the case. 
 
The a priori postulate of an exogenous equilibrium for economic navigation, however, is 
deeply ingrained in economic thinking. In the first round of visionary information technology 
economics in the 1960s it was seriously believed even in the West that Soviet style central 
planning would work, and that western and eastern economies would converge onto a similar 
mode of national economic planning. A term used was the ”mixed economy”. The ”mature” 
Lange (1967) illustrated these beliefs when he as late as 1967 brushed away Hayek’s (1937) 
argument of complexity and the impossibility of central planning by saying (p. 158) ”what is 
the trouble? Let us put the simultaneous equations on an electronic computer and we shall 
obtain the solution in less than a second”. This discussion has now died out. Many   6
management researchers in the West, however, argued that the system would soon 
successfully take over many dominant top executive decisions (for a survey see Eliasson 
1976). People would come and go. The system´s capacity to structure and analyze vast 
amounts of information would embody the management competence. Simon ( 1960, 1965) in 
fact argued that within 25 years high level management problems would be solved by 
artificial intelligence. 
 
Neo-walrasian economics was the intellectual foundation of Soviet central planning even 
though its practitioners did not know it. When rephrased as competitive equilibrium analysis 
the same story sounded credible in Western market economies. To all central planners of the 
East and to most Keynesian policy makers of the West during the 1960s and the 1970s 
unpredictable disturbances in markets and the consequent decision mistakes were negative 
events and instances of undesired economic waste that should be eliminated by informed 
policy (Demsetz 1969, Pelikan ,1986, 1988). Such was also the foundation of management 
teaching, writing and practice in the late 1960s based on the idea of a possible full 
information market economy. When the right intellectual support tools had been made 
available all business situations would be under intellectual control. 
 
This situation ended abruptly in the disorderly 1970s. During the post-oil crisis years many 
business mistakes were made and most long range planning departments in the large firms 
were shut down (Eliasson 1984b, 1996a). In the unpredictable environments of 
experimentally organized economies the business administration people now apparently 
needed better advice than what they got from mainstream economists (see Eliasson 1992). 
Joseph Schumpeter was dusted off, modified and gradually reintroduced into mainstream 
economics. Despite the costly learning experience of the 1970s the engineers in some 40, 
mostly large IT firms, however, set out in the early 1980s to design and market “universal” 
business information systems based on the full information idea. They all failed, some 
completely, to the tune of billions of lost dollars (Eliasson 1996a, Ch. VI and pp. 243 f). So it 
appears that economics is still dichotomized into static economics where actors are assumed 
to be fully informed and to make no mistakes and dynamic economics, the latter (Lamberton 
1971a, p. 12) ” dealing with problems of information and knowledge”. To clarify the 
distinction between static and dynamic economics we have to clarify the role of information 
and knowledge in economic theory and that is best done by introducing the three information 
paradoxes. 
 
The three information paradoxes 
 
Economic or business failure depends on what is assumed about the space of business or 
investment opportunities, or what there is to know or be ignorant about. Is this state space (if 
you have a mathematical model) small and transparent or large, complex and non-
transparent? The neo-walrasian model assumes a small and fully transparent state space and, 
hence eliminates business mistakes by assumption, barring sometimes a stochastic error. The 
theory of the EOE makes the exactly contrary assumption. The business opportunities space is 
assumed to be so large as to make it impossible to know more than a fraction of the 
opportunities, and in addition, by implication, that the different actors know different 
fractions of the whole. This means that if you have a fully specified model of the EOE, the   7
WAD model can be turned into a special theoretical case when you gradually diminish the 
complexity towards full transparency at no information and communications costs.  
 
(Table 1 in about here) 
 
My departure from the mainstream model, therefore, begins with the introduction of the 
Knowledge Based Information Economy  and the three information paradoxes of Table 1 
(Eliasson 1990b). The knowledge based economy establishes the assumptions for the theory 
of the EOE, namely the immense and non-transparent investment opportunities set that is 
impossible to survey more than fractionally by each agent from one point. This also 
establishes the critical role of information processing and communications in the theory of the 
EOE and any derived theory of management based on it. 
 
I first assume that the state space of our model is initially so large that it is non-transparent to 
any economic actor from any place in that space. I argue that this assumption is empirically 
well established. It follows that all actors will then be boundedly rational in the sense of being 
ignorant about circumstances that may eventually become critical for their survival. If this 
ignorance is heterogeneous (differently composed over the population of actors) which I 
assume, tacit knowledge in the sense of limited communicability can be demonstrated to exist 
(Eliasson 1990a) and business mistakes will be a typical characteristic of economic dynamics. 
 
Under the assumption of no information or learning (transactions) costs this state space will, 
however, eventually be fully explored at no costs and we will be back in the standard full 
information model
3. To complete Paradox One , therefore, the situation of significant 
ignorance has to be made permanent. This is achieved by assuming that actors learn from 
experimenting and failing sometimes, and that such learning expands the state space to the 
extent ( we add) that it may even expand faster than we are capable of learning. This 
completes Information Paradox One of Table 1 (Eliasson 1990b, pp 46 ff) or the so called 
Särimner effect from the Viking sagas. Särimner was the pig in Valhalla that the Vikings ate 
for supper. In the morning, however, it came back to life to be eaten again for supper. The 
difference in economics under the assumptions of Paradox One is that the pig, now the 
economy may be growing in the process. Exploiting the business opportunities space will 
expand the opportunities space. We have a positive sum game (Eliasson 1987 a, p.29). 
 
Information Paradox Two refers to the increasingly intangible nature of inputs in and outputs 
from the economic process, qualities that cannot easily be quantified to the extent that we are 
beginning to know less and less about what is becoming more and more important (Eliasson 
1990b,p.16). 
 
                                                 
3 This is one of the problems that Baumol-Panzar-Willig 1982 had to assume away to make their contestable 
market theory an equilibrium model. Already Dahlman (1979) , however, observed that economic mistakes had 
to be accepted as a positive transactions cost that made the neoclassical model inconsistent (See also Eliasson 
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Information Paradox Three can probably be derived from the other two. Since nobody can 
take in the whole of the investment opportunities space of the EOE various simplifying 
information and interpretation devices (read theories/models) have to be resorted to, using 
information middlemen (“ consultants”) that sell the information output of their analytic 
methods, contributing more or less to a general misunderstanding of the whole. Already 
Ackoff (1967) recognized this possibility as a ” business misinformation system”. In the EOE 
such misunderstanding can however be demonstrated to be productive if sufficiently 
heterogeneous. It can be seen as part of the experimental innovation process generating 
business mistakes but also positive innovations that would never have been tried and 
discovered in a more regulated economic environment. Antonov-Trofinov (1993) demonstrate 
through experiments on a simulation model  that  centralized information processing 
according to one perception (model) of the economy  only reduces innovations and growth 
over the longer time. Reasonably free experimentation, on the other hand, enhances economic 
growth because new opportunities are discovered that have been ” censored” by the centrally 
imposed interpretation model. This is also the basic idea of the theory of the EOE. 
 
But the opportunities space is not infinite, and we want to avoid such an assumption.  The 
business opportunities space is always bounded  from above, but  these bounds keep 
expanding from learning and (The First Information Paradox again, Eliasson 1990b, pp. 46f) 
may expand faster than all actors together are capable of learning, thus making each actor 
increasingly ignorant about all that can be learnt about. Mathematically this situation arises 
when large resources are used up in information processing and communications, so large that 
they have to be factored in as determinants of the process focus of the economic system (call 
it an equilibrium). The bounds are then determined by the unknown sum total of all 
knowledge of each actor in the state space and of all possible useful, but even more unknown 
combinations of the same knowledge, and strategic responses to that knowledge (Eliasson 
1990b, 1992, 1996a) . This leaves each actor grossly ignorant about circumstances that will 
now and then be critical for its survival. Hence, business mistakes will be a normal 
phenomenon in the Experimentally Organized Economy. In fact, information processing and 
communications costs have to include the economic consequences of business mistakes, and 
this (G. Eliasson-A. Eliasson 2002) turns a number of standard theoretical predictions on their 
heads. But there is also a benefit. Search into the same state space for more investment 
opportunities will create new opportunities (new combinations, or data of the state space with 
so far not discovered combinations). This, for one thing, means that the economy will always 
be operating not only far below its production possibilities frontiers. The production 
possibilities frontiers and opportunity costs are not even determinable in the EOE. This is an 
implicit assumption in old Austrian economics, notably in Carl Menger (1971) and in the 
Joseph Schumpeter model I from 1911. The state space of the EOE grows from being 
exploited. 
The Accounts of the Knowledge Based Information Economy 
 
Adam Smith (1776) laid down the principal design of a decentralized market economy in 
which the division of labor makes economies of scale ”in the small” possible and the 
realization of large systems productivity effects at the macro level feasible. This benefit, 
however, came at a significant information and communications (market transaction) cost, a 
fact that advocates of the ”modern” mathematical representations of the ”invisible hand” took   9
a long time to understand.
4 The organization of the division of labor is an instance of 
innovative behavior and entrepreneurship (item 1, Table 2). This organization evolved 
gradually in the market. Once the necessary choices and selections had been made (item 2), 
however, economic activity had to be coordinated physically (transports) and through 
communication (item 3). 
 
Once an innovative design has been accomplished, competitors would be on ”your doorstep” 
to learn (imitate, item 4). If your organization is large enough you would want to diffuse the 
knowledge throughout the organization. You would also want to sell your knowledge at a 
profit (consulting). Learning, hence, becomes a general and resource-using economic activity. 
 
The number of possible solutions defines the size of the business opportunities space that 
each agent/ entrepreneur faces and has to explore in order to enact business experiments. In 
doing so the entrepreneur is directed by a limited vision of all possibilities (bounded 
rationality). This limited vision of the whole defines his or her ignorance. Hence, it becomes 
important to understand how agents access and interpret information being generated by the 
ongoing economic process, and to what extent this information can be used to predict the 
future. Since each agent, furthermore, has his or her particular vision as guidance, there will 
be limitations on communication because of limited and differently composed receiver 
competence.  Much of the knowledge put to use in a firm, especially high-level knowledge, 
vested in the top competent team of a firm will be tacit in the sense of limited 
communicability in coded form as information (Eliasson 1990a, p.277). Tacit knowledge is 
acquired through on-the-job learning and filters through the economy (selection) through the 
acquisition of the whole firm, or parts of firms in the M&A market or through the mobility of 
people or teams of people with competence in the labor market (Eliasson 1991b, Eliasson-
Eliasson 2002). I have now introduced the four information activities of the knowledge-based 
information economy: innovation, selection, coordination and learning (see Table 2 and 
Eliasson 1990b). Together they cover all information and communication activities in the 
economy and represent its intellectual superstructure (its memory) that controls all other 
physical activities. 
 
    (Table 2 in about here) 
These four information and communications activities are all present in the firm as 
administrative processes, and in the market or in any combination of the two forming 
competence blocs (See section 4 below and Eliasson and Eliasson 1996) supporting the 
manufacturing of some particular set of related products. Together these intelligence activities 
have been shown to make up the dominant resource uses in the economy accounting for more 
than 50 percent of total resource use in the average Swedish manufacturing firm and around 
75 percent at the GNP level (Eliasson 1986, 1990a,b)
5. Hence, the transactions costs assumed 
to be zero or nearly so in the WAD model is the dominant cost item in the real world. These 
transactions costs are incurred as economic actors navigate to reach desired or targeted goals. 
The reliability of navigation again rests on the existence of some underlying and reasonably 
stable organizational structure to relate to. The more submerged and unaccessible by analytic 
                                                 
4 When Gérard Debreu received the Prize in Economics in Honor of Alfred Nobel he was told that he got it 
because of his modeling of the invisible hand. 
5 or goods related service production. Machlup (1962) estimated that this must make up at least 29 percent of 
GNP. Lamberton (1971a) observed that that ratio must be on the increase. Wallis & North (1986) placed the 
number at at least 45 percent.   10
means that structure the more important it becomes to decentralize information processing 
and communications over markets. The larger the total costs in the economy that have to be 
devoted to information processing and communications the more submerged that organization 
structure obviously will be. Hence, there is no way to understand economic development 
without understanding the role of information and communications technology in production, 
and the matching knowledge capital. Since that technology is largely organizational, the 
underlying structure that guides the navigation of economic actors becomes endogenized  
being determined by the information and communications processes, and not the ”fix point” 
or economic lighthouse that would make navigation reliable ( that conventional neo-walrasian 
theory assumes exists). To use the analogy of Eliasson-Sharefkin-Ysander (1983); the sea 
may be so violent that the broom buoy that has been somehow fastened to its bottom to guide 
the navigation of ships is dislocated by the waves. If sufficiently dislocated it will become 
outright misleading. Since the underlying submerged structure of the economy that functions 
as such a buoy for economic navigation is partly made up of all the actors that individually 
attempt to interpret that same structure there will constantly be situations when the decision 
machinery enters an infinite regress where economic actors will misinterpret the market 
signals. Such ”chaos” in the ” misinformation society ” (Eliasson 1990b, p. 34) easily arises 
in non-linear economic models. In fact, in the ”infinitely” large and complex  state space  (or 
investment opportunities space ) of the EOE all actors will constantly be grossly ignorant 
about circumstances that may be critical for their survival and this situation is likely to occur 
now and then. Under these circumstances we can now present life in the EOE quite simply. 
 
3.  Management under the Experimental Market Regime 
 
The three information paradoxes allow the characteristics of the EOE to be derived. Even 
simple tasks in the EOE (the entrepreneur will soon learn) can be solved to one´s satisfaction 
in a large number of ways. 
 
The Unexplored Potential 
 
 The higher up, the more complex the total decision problem of a large business organization 
and the larger the number of possible solutions. Some of these solutions are better than others. 
The first characteristic of the EOE is that the entrepreneur will never know them all, and 
willnever know how good they are until he has tried them. 
 
Second, since no actor, including Government, can survey the entire business opportunities 
space from one point business mistakes will constantly be made by all actors all the time. 
Such mistakes should therefore be regarded as unavoidable and  a normal cost for economic 
development. Third, some actors may hit upon the absolutely best solution by chance, but 
they will never know, and nobody else either. Hence, fourth, the economy will always be 
operating far below its production possibilities frontier, thus violating a standard assumption 
of neoclassical theory. 
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Fifth, as a business actor you must always believe in your proposed business experiment. If 
not, you cannot act decisively and forcefully. However, whatever you have invented you 
know with almost certainty that there will be many potential solutions that are much better. 
You therefore ( sixth) have to recognize that among your many competitors you cannot be 
alone with such a good idea as yours. You have to act decisively and prematurely on the basis 
of insufficient information and your competent judgment (intuition) before somebody else has 
acted successfully. Each new solution, therefore, has the character of a business experiment. 
In fact in the EOE it is more risky to be passive and do nothing than to act, because then you 
will certainly be overrun by a competitor. So you have to keep improving to the best of your 
knowledge. If you are not good you will be competed out of business anyway.  Hence again, 
most decisions will be more or less in error, not infrequently a devastating error, but 
sometimes, perhaps often, a winner will be captured 
 
The competence specification of a firm in the EOE 
 
The competence of a business firm in the EOE can now be categorized as in Table 3 (Eliasson 
1996a, p. 56, 1998, p. 87). The bottom line (item 1) is to possess the needed business intuition 
that allows you to structure the decision situation onto a calculable format (convert 
uncertainty into calculable risks, to use Knight´s (1921) terminology) and be guided in the 
right direction. Being in business you have to believe in your intuition. This means that the 
business risks you are taking on will appear small to you; you understand the situation 
intuitively. On the other hand, to the outsider (item 2) who doesn´t possess your 
understanding the situation may appear utterly risky. This establishes a rational foundation for 
the asymmetric understanding that characterizes the relationship between the entrepreneur 
and his resource provider or financier, the venture capitalist (See below).  
 
Once you have acted on your intuition you still have to reckon with the possibility that you 
may be all wrong, a recognition that is extremely difficult to combine in the  mind of one 
individual who has  a strong belief in what he/she is doing. Such en entrepreneurial capacity, 
hence, is rare, and lonely entrepreneurs are naturally exposed to failure. In large firms, on the 
other hand this dichotomy can be solved through organization, i.e. by having different people 
responsible for different tasks, for instance innovation, execution and control. Then there will 
be a bias towards conservatism and caution or optimism and adventure depending on which 
group dominates the corporate top level decisions (Eliasson 1976, Eliasson-Eliasson 2002). 
Thus, for instance, Swedish Electrolux had the ideal top level competence configuration 
during its innovative development into a global giant in white ware goods during the 1970s 
and 1980s. It had a strong minded project filter in the form of its controller and an efficient 
operations head who  rapidly realized whatever project came through the filter and an 
”imaginative innovator”, Dr Hans Werthen as CEO, who got whatever still convinced him 
after the controller´s resistance through the filter (Eliasson 1984b, 1986). Large firms are, 
therefore, normally not as good as many individuals and small businesses in creating new 
ideas, but they are better in identifying and correcting mistakes ( items 3 and 4) to the extent 
that they become overly cautious and non-innovative (Eliasson 1976,1996a). Hence, if they 
do not have the right staffing of competence at the top, as in Electrolux at the time, which will 
always be a temporary phenomenon they will eventually fail, and if the market is not 
sufficiently informed to deprive them of their resources they will dwindle slowly away, 
wasting large resources in the process. However, on those rare occasions when an innovative   12
talent stands at the helm of a large corporation enormous wealth will be created. The 
balancing act executed in the financial markets, therefore, is the most important allocation 
function in an advanced market economy. Its efficiency depends on the organization of 
hierarchies and markets such that each project is subjected to a maximum competent and 
varied evaluation (Eliasson-Eliasson 2002) thus minimizing the loss of winners. Competence 
bloc theory deals with this balancing act. 
 
Firm Dynamics makes Learning Unreliable 
 
If a project has finally been cleared through the first four items repetitive or routine 
operations (item 5) take over at least for some time. Then comes the final (item 6) learning 
stage. Standard wisdom has it that you learn from the business experiments to improve 
business intuition in the next round of business experiments (item 1). In my first survey of 
business practice this learning feed back was regarded as ”analytical” (Eliasson 1976).The 
past was useful and offered reliable indications of the future. The experience of the next 
period was the opposite. Learning from the steady state years of the 1960s was not reliable for 
the post-oil crisis adjustment of the 1970s ( Eliasson 1984b, 1996a). Despite that the 1980s 
witnessed a number of successful innovative reorganizations of large Swedish manufacturing 
firms into global giants, Electrolux being one. The current situation is more problematic. 
Constant reorganization has made it increasingly difficult to integrate operations efficiency 
and dynamic orientation, especially within the already large corporations. As a consequence 
they are failing at a rate not previously experienced. In fact, the theory of the EOE tells us this 
must be the case. When the internal structure of the hierarchy is constantly changing as a 
consequence of ongoing operations the information signals generated within the organization 
will be telling unreliable stories when interpreted by the experience of the past. Under such 
circumstances learning and decision making within a hierarchy can never be reliable and 
should be distributed. Competence bloc theory explains how. 
 
5.  Competence Bloc Theory 
 In the EOE each agent sets up a business experiment that is tested in a confrontation with all 
other agents in the market. The business experiment is frequently found to be a business 
mistake. Sometimes a winner is identified and carried on to industrial scale production and 
distribution. The pace of development of the macro economy is defined by its ability to 
create, identify and commercialize the winners and get rid of the losers. Hence, the 
experimentally organized economy grows endogenously through competitive selection 
(Eliasson 1996a). 
 
That selection occurs at all levels within firms, and between firms. Efficient selection in the 
EOE within  and between firms is defined as the minimizing of the economic incidence of the 
two types of errors in Table 4A, i.e. of keeping losers on for too long and of ”losing the 
winners”. 
 
Centralizing knowledge to one point requires that it can be coded and interpreted as standard 
information, and, hence, reduces the total knowledge that enters each decision to such codable 
knowledge, or communicable information.  The narrow selection criteria within a hierarchy   13
thus increase the probability of losing the winners. Competence bloc theory, hence, explains 
how a different and distributed organization can be used to achieve a more efficient allocation 
of tacit, human embodied competencies on business problems. A competence bloc lists the 
minimum number of actors with tacit competence that are needed to successfully generate, 
identify, select, expand and exploit new business ideas (G. Eliasson – Å. Eliasson 1996). At 
one extreme all this competence can be distributed over markets, and at the other be 
internalized within one hierarchy. The less distributed the less varied the competence. 
Competence bloc theory can therefore also be seen as a prototype structure for an extended 
(over markets of subcontractors) theory of the firm. Once that is accepted we have also 
demonstrated that (within the EOE) the right mix between market coordination (competition) 
and hierarchical coordination (Management, See Table 2) will have to be an integral part of a 
strategic management problem; a dynamic version of Coase´s ( 1937) endogenizing of the 
internal structure and the limits of the firm. Organization competence becomes the critical 
strategic business competence and therefore also (as a consequence) determines the optimal 
mix between central control and delegation. Such internal reorganization, however, also 
disrupts the ”grammar of the language of the firms” and makes their internal information 
systems unreliable (Eliasson 1976, 1986 pp.64ff,1996a). The design of the internal 
information and business system of a firm has to recognize the constantly changing 
delimitations and internal structures of the firm. Competence bloc theory again is the 
prototype of that design. 
 
Product quality is the paramount characteristic of innovative product competition in the New 
Economy. The perhaps most important quality demanded in an advanced market economy is 
product or quality variation. Only the customers can individually decide which variant he or 
she prefers.
6 This places the customer in core. One critical task of the competence bloc, 
hence, is to make sure that customers’ preferences and competencies filter down to the actors 
in the competence bloc that create and select innovations. When ”efficiently” designed the 
competence bloc organization minimizes the economic incidence of the two types of business 
errors of Table 4A. 
 
      (Tables 4 A,B in about here) 
 In an efficiently organized and well staffed (with competence) competence bloc potential 
winners are exposed to a maximum of varied competencies such that they experience 
increasing returns to continued search. The innovation and selection process in the 
competence bloc (through Table 4B) is organized as follows: 
 
First, the customer occupies a premier (key) position in competence bloc analysis. The 
products created and chosen never get better than what customers are capable of appreciating 
and willing to pay for. The long-term direction of technical change, therefore, is always set by 
the customers. This is so even though the innovator, entrepreneur or industrialist takes the 
initiative. But quite often the customer takes the initiative. Technological development, 
therefore, requires a sophisticated customer base, capable of appreciating new products 
(Eliasson 1998, G. Eliasson – Å. Eliasson 1996). The more advanced and radically new the 
product technologies, the more important customer quality becomes. The customers of the 
                                                 
6 Product variation is a form of product quality. If the demand for variation is sufficiently large information 
paradox two applies. See Table 1 above.   14
competence bloc contribute (commercial) competence in the technological choice process. 
They accept or reject products offered them in the market, thereby signaling what they want. 
But they also actively look for products that they need, and they may be directly involved, 
contributing user knowledge, in some phases of the development of the product. This is often 
the case when it comes to very advanced and complicated products such as military and 
commercial airplanes (Eliasson 1996b, 2001). A rational strategy for a producer with 
sophisticated products that cannot find competent customers close by, therefore, is to actively 
look for more sophisticated customers and a better market elsewhere, a strategy constantly 
forgotten in standard textbooks in marketing. As already observed by Burenstam – Linder 
(1961) the customers of the rich economies contribute to the competitive advantages 
7 of their 
firms. In terms of competence bloc theory, local access to competent customers is a strong 
regional attractor for advanced firms. 
 
Second, basic technology is internationally available, but the capacity to receive it and make a 
business of it requires local competence. Part of this receiver competence (Eliasson 1987, 
1990a, 1996a, pp. 8, 14) is the ability to create new winning combinations of old and new 
technologies (innovation). 
 
Third, some actors or organizations are better than others when it comes to achieving 
intellectual order in a seemingly chaotic business situation. We call them entrepreneurs. The 
task of the entrepreneur is to identify commercial winners among the many suppliers of 
innovations and to get his/her technology choice on a commercial footing. The entrepreneur 
acts on the perceived business opportunity (entre prendre in French). 
 
The entrepreneur, however, rarely has resources of his own to move the project forward. He, 
therefore, (fourth) needs funding from a competent venture capitalist, i.e. a provider of risk 
finance , capable of understanding innovators of radically new technology and being able to 
identify business needs and provide context. The money is the least important thing. What 
matters (G. Eliasson – Å. Eliasson 1996, Eliasson 2003a) is the competence to understand 
and identify winners and, hence, provide reasonably priced equity funding. Venture capital 
providers in competence bloc theory are defined and identified by their industrial 
competence.
8 Since the supplies of innovators are by their definition varied and outside the 
range of local industrial experience, and the supply of finance controlled by experience and 
ruled by caution, the supply of varied and industrially competent venture capital is by its very 
nature extremely scarce . It is the critical part of the overall selection process and, if lacking 
in performance, is liable to result in the ” loss of winners”. An innovative and entrepreneurial 
economy thus needs industrially experienced (competent) financiers. Without a rich 
endowment of such venture capital competence, you won’t see many entrepreneurs. Hence, 
                                                 
7 Burenstam-Linder (1961) used the term ” comparative advantage” from standard international trade theory, but 
the implications of competence bloc theory are much broader than that. 
8 Hence venture capital is defined by its associated competence contribution. It is not sufficient to carry the 
name. In practice we are talking of very early financing , before the financial community understands what is 
going on. The observation made recently ( 2003, Eliasson 2003a) that Swedish so called venture capitalists are 
refocusing their funding to later stages in the entrepreneurial process when projects have already been 
recognized and established, therefore, is a sign of  ”incompetence” The venture capitalists also contribute 
managerial, financing and marketing competence through their network, but this comes after the 
”understanding”. Such services are normally available in the market and, consequently, are less critical.    15
the venture capitalist and his escape (exit) market (fifth) are the most important incentive 
supporting actors in the competence bloc. With no understanding venture capitalists the price 
of new capital will be prohibitively high, or funding will not be available, and winners will be 
filtered away. With badly functioning exit markets the incentives for venture capitalists will 
be small and, hence, also for the entrepreneurs and the innovators. Completeness of the 
competence bloc is, therefore, a necessary requirement for the viable incentive structures that 
guarantee increasing returns to continued search for winners, i.e. for new industry formation. 
None of the ”pillars” (the actors) of the competence bloc can be missing, or the whole 
incentive structure will fail to develop (G. Eliasson – Å.Eliasson 1996, Eliasson 1998). 
 
Finally and sixth, when the selection process has run its course and winners have been 
selected a new type of industrial competence is needed to take the innovations on to industrial 
scale production and distribution. We cannot tell in advance what the formal role of the 
industrialist is (CEO, chairman of the Board, an active owner etc.). He or she figures in the 
competence bloc on account if his or her capacity to contribute functional competence. 
 
The diversity of the opportunity set of the EOE means that the competence needed to identify 
winners cannot be specified in advance. Hence, an efficient project identification and 
selection in the competence bloc requires that a large number of each type of actor in the 
competence bloc be present. Such horizontal variety is a necessary condition for maximum 
exposure of each project to a competent evaluation. Compared to the internal project 
evaluation in a large firm transaction costs may be higher, since the evaluation is done in a 
distributed fashion, involving many independent actors in the market. Narrowing down the 
evaluation to an internal procedure within a hierarchy, on the other hand, raises the risk of 
losing a winner which constitutes the really large cost, and hence lowers the efficiency of 
project selection. This is not uncommon. Large firms, such as IBM internalized most of the 
competence for a long time and business history is full of near losses, the only ones that can 
be identified. The third phase of empirical observations in this study offers a similar example. 
Management in large firms distributing their production globally to gain competitive 
advantage has often lacked the experience to make the right strategic combinations and to 
operate constantly changing hierarchies and, hence, fail at a rate not previously experienced 
(Eliasson 2004). 
The actors of the competence bloc can be chosen and organized in a large number of ways as 
a firm or an industry to achieve efficient project selection. Competence bloc theory, hence, is 
an analytical device to explain the dynamics of this organization and the development of an 
industry driven by the complex interaction of competent actors, the competence of whom to 
perform particular tasks (functions) cannot be defined (specified) as to content, only be 
characterized as to results (output). Since the competence bloc not only creates, identifies and 
selects winners, but also supports winners by directing (financial) resources to them it 





6. Learning  in a distributed hierarchy   16
 
Introducing the competence bloc as a distributed or extended firm organization opens up 
analysis for new conclusions. 
First, in the EOE firm management has to be organized to cope with variety (innovation) and 
focus (production efficiency) simultaneously. This is a scarce and ”split talent” in individuals 
and organizations alike that most people cannot cope with. In firms the task has been solved 
through organization, keeping the variety and focus people apart (Eliasson 1976), but with 
time, success and size (growth) of the firm focus on operational efficiency tends to take over. 
Firm management becomes conservative and narrow minded, and the firm often succumbs 
when its market is subjected to radical change. Attempts to prepare for this by maintaining a 
diversified portfolio of incubator activities within the hierarchy have bad performance records 
because top level management attention tends to be paid to core operations. The new mode of 
integrated production distributed flexibly over hierarchies and markets of subcontractors, and 
achieving variation through strategic acquisitions and divestment may be an organizational 
method of solving the internal innovation problem of large firms, but it has been extremely 
competence demanding in the sense that management often lacks the experience and 
competence to identify the right industrial combinations (Eliasson 1996b, 1999b, p. 31, 
Eliasson-Eliasson 2002). 
 
Second, considering its limited awareness of the full content of the opportunities space firm 
management has to count on the possibility that its decision may be wrong. To understand 
this theoretically, think about a practically unlimited set of opportunities (Information 
Paradox One of Table 1) of which you know some. For a competent business leader/manager 
this subset should include many different items. Part of the competence to deal with variation 
is to be broadly aware of the possible outcomes. However, there is also the ability to choose, 
which requires an entirely different set of competencies. So there are two chances of being 
wrong: 
-  not being aware 
-  focusing on the wrong opportunity.  
This in turn relates to the two fundamental errors of Table 4A of (a) keeping the wrong 
project for too long and (b) missing the winner. Scientific management did not recognize this 
problem. With the static equilibrium model as the bottom line it adopted a predictable 
planning mode for operations, expecting to be correct on the average. Such a firm (Eliasson 
1976) would place confidence in the capacity of the strategic long-range planners on the staff 
to map the future and substitute detached analysis for business judgment. This led to 
monumental failure already in the disorderly markets of the 1970s. 
Third, in the EOE a premium is placed on flexibility. Actors in the EOE are always grossly 
ignorant of circumstances that may become critical for their survival but still have to move 
prematurely on the basis of scant and unreliable information. Hence, they constantly commit 
more or less serious business mistakes and have to be prepared to change their strategy. 
Flexibility in the EOE is achieved in two stages. Most important is to be right in terms of 
Table 3. But if internal corrections fail to come off, the market clicks in to enforce change. 
During the last decades financial market development in combination with new technology 
has significantly enhanced flexibility by making new combinations over competence blocs 
available and enforcing adjustment.   17
The competence of financial markets to correct misguided firm management is an 
increasingly pertinent question in view of the dramatic development in financial markets in 
recent years. Rybczynski (1993) distinguished between three financial regimes; the industrial 
bank, the capital market and the securitized regimes, being introduced in that order. Each 
regime had been more efficient than the former in enforcing hierarchical change (break up) on 
firms that were not performing up to the standards of the market and also in supporting the 
reallocation and recombination of the fractions of broken up firms being traded in markets. So 
far only the US and the international financial markets can be said to be operating full fledged 
securitized systems. Many, however, argue that the capacity of financial markets to enforce 
change is not matched by a corresponding understanding of what to do instead. Hence, 
incompetent management has been forced to leave early, which is of course good, but also 
competent management taking a long- term view and failure to show good quarterly results
9. 
Against this could be said that broad based financial markets will always have at least some 
long-term investors capable of understanding such companies and taking profitable long-term 
positions (Wihlborg 1993). The industrial bank organization with a portfolio of firms 
associated with a commercial bank was a first attempt to introduce industrial competence in 
the financial community and prepare firms for new demands on broadbased hierarchical 
reconfiguration during the early parts of the 20
th century The argument has been that the 
industrial bank organization has made industrially competent long-term strategic decisions 
possible (Dahmen 1993). Earlier, at least, the business configurations around Deutsche Bank 
in Germany and the Wallenberg controlled Stockholms Enskilda Bank in Sweden have been 
quoted as examples . The industrial bank organization is, however, struggling to survive in 
Germany and Sweden in the new and highly competitive global economic environment. But 
judging from the increased rate of failure among large German and Swedish firms its capacity 
to embody variation and flexibility in corporate decision making has not been sufficient 
(Eliasson-Eliasson 2002, Eliasson 2004). 
 
Fourth, with constantly changing globally distributed and integrated production the 
experimental management mode of the firm in the EOE firm focusing on intuitive business 
judgment (item 1 in Table 4) and subsequent error identification and correction (items 3 and 
4) will not be reliably supported by learning under item 6. This new situation is a challenge to 
learning, competence development and structured experience accumulation in large business 
organizations. It has been well recognized in the business community that a varied career in a 
large business hierarchy is the preferred substitute form of higher education over graduate 
academic training, even though the latter enhances intellectual flexibility and the capacity to 
learn on the job (Eliasson 1994,1996c). But a career experience from different functions 
within one hierarchy is no longer sufficient. Distributed experience from many hierarchies 
enhances the capacity to cope flexibly with the larger variety of business challenges in the 
New Economy. 
 
The new C&C technology is, in fact, opening up an entirely new agenda for innovative 
management practice that should as soon as possible also be part of management theory. 
Management theory, accounting theory and business monitoring and control theory still view 
the firm as a coordinated, well defined and controllable financial entity. Beginning long ago 
(Eliasson 1986) firm production began to be distributed over and integrated through the 
market to begin with in the form of outsourcing of physical production. In the last decade or 
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so C&C technology or virtual visualization has been rapidly making the distributing of 
product development a possibility. The next step, clearly manifest already in the biotech and 
pharmaceutical industry has been the sourcing of new technology in the markets for strategic 
acquisitions, diffusing the notion of a firm. The opportunity is the possibilities of integrating 
within the same business system the innovative capabilities of the small firm with the 
economies of scale of the large business organization (Eliasson- Eliasson 2002). The 
challenge has been the ability to integrate the systems coordination of both technology 
acquisition, product development and manufacturing over the market. Under such an 
organizational regime distributed over the market, efficient, transaction costs minimizing 
coordination will not be run through a monolithically controlled hierarchy but partly through 
arms length contractual arrangements in the market. Standard business control systems will 
not be applicable and the needed management model and competence will be entirely 
different from the one developed for the  ” controllable” business hierarchy. Competence bloc 
theory points the way of how to develop both new organizational forms and new theory.  The 
potential benefits for ongoing businesses are, however, so large that business organizational 
structures will certainly evolve that way. The interesting question raised here will be how 
long it will take for management practice to come on top of the practical problem and how 
much longer it will take for the theory of the firm and management theory to catch up with 
practice. It is therefore of interest to connect back to the art of theorizing in economics. 
 
7.  The Art of Choosing the Right Decision Model for the Occasion 
 
Unstable and endogenously changing economic structures (”fundamentals”) are the source of 
unpredictability and what makes economic learning unreliable. While prediction and learning 
of (assumed) stable structures are the dominant business mode that we can derive from the 
economic theory of the firm, experiments and recognition of winners not experienced before 
dominate the business problems of the firm in the EOE. 
 
Insurance companies base their business on trading in computable actuarial risks based on 
experience determined distributions. Such are also the assumptions of rational expectations 
and efficient market theory. Such theory, and reliable statistical inference are contingent on a 
stable and learnable set of information (stable and comprehensible ”fundamentals”). Such 
theory, as well as insurance business, has a problem if the learnable information set is 
influenced by learning itself.  Knight (1921) realized that the real business world was rather 
of such a nature, dealing in difficult to define events, occurrences that could not be predicted 
as drawings from an empirically determined stable distribution of possible events. In general, 
Knight regarded business risks as principally and practically uninsurable. He furthermore 
suggested that the particular ability of the business manager was to convert such uncertainty 
into subjectively calculable risks on the basis of which he or she acted with confidence 
(LeRoy and Singell 1987, Eliasson 1990a). For the outsider then the risk level (item 2 in 
Table 3) might appear prohibitive. For the businessman, entrepreneur, being confident in his 
or her assessment of the situation, the subjective risks, however, appeared low and the 
business situation under subjective control. The entrepreneur, so to speak, converted a highly 
complex non-linear environment onto a subjectively computable format that allowed single 
valued decisions to be derived. So while the economic environment is a highly non-linear 
dynamic system, individuals and firm decision makers have to come up with single valued 
decisions to stay organized and ” mentally healthy”. They reconstruct their conceptualization   19
or approximation of reality as a linear equilibrium model (Eliasson 1992). This makes the art 
of choosing the right business model for the occasion the dominant business problem 
(Eliasson 1996a, p.89f, 101). 
 
Modern finance literature on the other hand makes no distinction between uncertainty and 
risk and uses the terms synonymously. All business uncertainties are reduced to computable 
and insurable risks. Besides the absurd implications of such assumptions, they detract 
attention from the basic character of business life, namely true and individually experienced 
uncertainty. One consequence of this has been the plethora of attempts to analyze the results 
of statistical learning theory and the diffusion of information in the neo-walrasian type 
economic setting. If you know the functional form of the distribution of risks and if it is 
mathematically nice (for a survey, see Lindh 1993) statistical learning applies. Repeated 
observations of the data emitted from the distributions allow you to ascertain its coefficients 
with any desired accuracy. For this to hold it has to be assumed that (1) the underlying 
structure is sufficiently stable to allow for repetitive data generation, and (2) that information 
use carries no cost. If you don’t know the functional form of the distribution, however, you 
still have a problem. 
 
If the mathematical characteristics of the distributions are sufficiently non-linear (whether 
known or not) efficient statistical estimation techniques will not allow you to come up with 
consistent estimates of the underlying parameters.
10 Whether stable or not, under normal 
circumstances, the true underlying structure will forever remain unknown to you. If the 
environment is sufficiently complex any approximate estimable representation of the 
distribution will normally be unstable and the same results hold. In markedly non-linear 
economic environments there will exist no underlying exogenous and tractable structure that 
you can learn about and position yourself against in a reliable and stable way. Learning will 
have to be differently presented in such non-linear and experimentally organized 
environments than in statistical learning theory. The learning feed back in Table 3 is not 
reliable. This situation will arise under two circumstances: 
1.   Complexity 
  2.  Significant and unpredictable learning costs. 
Complexity was explained above. Learning costs increase with complexity but also increase 
with the instability of the underlying structures about which you aspire to learn. For instance, 
you incur costs while searching for the underlying fundamental structure. Once you have 
found it these information costs disappear, and since they have been codeterminants of the 
equilibrium, the equilibrium also shifts away, and you have to go on searching (Day 1993) for 
something that keeps evading you, and the more so the closer you come (Eliasson 1984a, 
199la). This peculiar explanation is needed for the simple reason that we are all trained in 
static equilibrium analysis. Complexity, in fact, is all we need to reject the neo-walrasian 
static equilibrium model and its entire superstructure of literature. This was done already in 
                                                 
10 This conclusion has two interpretations: (1) It may be practically impossible to process the data needed to 
estimate the model, or (2) the model may include specifications that make the process influence the underlying 
structure. Such non-linearities, characterizing path-dependent development, remove the repetitiveness needed to 
estimate the model. There will not be enough data to capture the structure. This time satisfactory estimation is 
theoretically impossible. 
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von Hayek (1937, 1940, 1945) long before the model was fully worked out mathematically by 
Arrow-Debreu (1954). 
 
The Swedish micro-to-macro model MOSES (Eliasson 1977, 1985, 1991a, c, Ballot-Taymaz 
1996) provides illustrations. We, its engineers, know its highly complex non-linear structure 
(its fundamentals). Hence, we can generate the data for outsiders to watch. Outsiders, 
however, have to guess on the specification of the model to understand its structure (Antonov-
Trofinov 1993). Let me use that model to illustrate two critical points. 
 
First, the highly non-linear structure of the micro-to-macro model can be approximated by a 
simple linear model from the economists’ tool box. We impose as Walras did on the ”Smith 
and Ricardo” models, an equilibrium market clearing constraint, forcing  all  actors to be in 
capital market equilibrium with the same rates of return. In the MOSES model this can only 
be achieved through repeated simulation of the dynamic competitive market processes 
pushing the entire economy, through enhanced competition, closer to the ”approximate static 
equilibrium” so defined. The assumption is that with efficient competition firms will learn all 
the hard way, or perish. The results (Eliasson 1983, 1984a, 1985, 1991a) are significative. 
The more the actors learned (the more informed about the perceived equilibrium they 
became) and the closer to static equilibrium the economy was being pushed by market forces 
the more unstable the model economy became and the more unreliable the price and quantity 
signals emitted by the market processes i.e. the more unreliable learning feed back in Table 3 
(item 6). Learning costs in terms of business mistakes escalated because of steeply decreasing 
returns to learning and the main learning cost was a chain reaction of business failure because 
of increasingly unreliable price signaling in markets. Eventually the economy collapsed.
11 
The closer to equilibrium the more unstable the underlying structure, the more shifty the 
equilibrium and the more unreliable the information emitted by the economy. This result 
accords with the uncertainty principle in physics and with the frustrating results of statistical 
learning theory (Lindh 1993). Reliable and interpretable price signals are only emitted if the 
economy (or the model) features a sufficiently stable exogenous quantity structure (the 
fundamentals), to be revealed by the price signals. If firms act on the basis of unreliable price 
signals structure is liable to change through the differentiated quantitative performance 
created by the mistaken decisions, for instance entry and exit. Expressed in other terms; static 
equilibrium does not exist as an operating point of the economy. Hence, the ongoing 
economic processes could not reveal (through market price and quantity signals) its location. 
 
Second, for an outsider to ascertain the unknown parameters of the fundamental structure of 
the micro-to-macro model some approximate model has to be estimated. Bounded rationality 
in Simon´s (1955) sense is introduced. Now economic theory enters. Antonov and Trofimov 
(1993), for instance, estimated a traditional Keynesian and neoclassical macro model on the 
data generated by the micro-to-macro model. These two linear approximations to the full 
model were constantly updated, as new data were being generated by the MOSES model and 
the firms in the MOSES model used the predictions of the econometric model approximations 
of MOSES in their planning. The mode of information generation, data collection and 
analysis of the agents in the MOSES model economy thus was allowed to influence total 
economic behavior and performance in the MOSES model. In some experiments firms were 
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forced to use the predictions of one or the other econometric model (”central planning”). In 
other experiments they could choose individually what information to use on the basis of the 
individual predictive performance of prices, sales etc. predictions of the official econometric 
models or their own more primitive projections. 
 
This is what we learned. The simple econometric approximations to the full model were of 
course incapable of uncovering anything interesting about the deeper structures of the 
MOSES model economy, since  new business combinations were not embodied in the crude 
model approximations. When the firms individually used their own crude projection models 
the business error rate increased. But some firms also stumbled onto, and were able to identify 
superior opportunities and capture them. The implications are obvious; (1) the more active, 
broad based and unrestricted search and/or (2) the larger the number of individual actors 
capable of understanding and identifying the opportunities that come in their way the larger 
the probability that successful experiments will be realized. Pluralism is thus needed to make 
efficient use of the knowledge base of the economy, not centralized information processing. 
The other side of this coin is costs in terms of an increased incidence of business mistakes and 
exits. Competition, however, also weeded out the mistaken actors or reduced their resource 
use, and the commercialization competence of the economy (represented by the competence 
blocs) increased the capture rate of winners. Hence, an experimental management mode 
combined with complete and varied competence blocs could generate faster aggregate growth 
in the MOSES economy than did the planned information diffusion and analytical 
management mode. The explanation is a more efficient use of the total knowledge base of the 
economy achieved through a decentralization of decisions over actors in the market such that 
those most informed and capable of deciding also get an opportunity to decide. Since also the 
decentralization itself requires competence the transaction costs increased in the form of more 
business mistakes, notably in the form of lost winners. On balance, however, the larger, more 
varied and more complex the knowledge base of an economy the more capable of generating 
and discovering winners and the more economical it is to decentralize decisions. 
 
This result illustrates the main theme of this paper. Comparing the statistical learning models 
with the experimental search model not only sets the centralized analytical mode of business 
management of the 1960s against the experimental mode of the 1980s, and for that reason 
theory against reality. It also demonstrates the impossibility of reliably informed decisions in 
the non -linear world of the EOE and the impossibility of identifying superior opportunities 




The analysis has been abstract and theoretical, but the implications are practical. Every 
manager tries to overcome frustrating uncertainty through resorting to some simple and 
analytically comprehensible management method. For reasons clarified, belief in such 
methods will eventually lead him or her astray . If all firms resort to analytical management 
methods they, furthermore, reinforce the past and, if practiced generally, the economy, very 
much as Ballot and Taymaz (1998) have shown theoretically, may get locked into an inferior 
structure. For the economy to get out of that lock-in and develop ahead of what seems 
”analytically possible” on the basis of the past, the economy needs many actors exhibiting   22
odd and analytically ”incomprehensible” behavior. This means viable new establishment 
(entry), a forceful exit of low performers and/or those unlucky ones that have made the wrong 
decision and are unable to reorient themselves in a new direction. When an innovative 
experimental entry process dominates the centrally managed large firms engaged in 
standardized production with the purpose of capturing increasing returns may get problems 
with competition. A dominance of  repetitive management competence, furthermore, is likely 
to be detrimental to the development of the competence needed to manage radically new 
industry, notably the distributed production and the ”loosely structured” hierarchies we tend 
to associate with the New Economy (Eliasson 2002a,b).The economy may then experience an 
increased rate of failure among the large firms. This is what Glete (1998) suggests has 
happened to Swedish engineering over the past century. This has to be taken into account in 
theorizing about the firm or about rational management methods. 
 
A theory of a firm or a hierarchy can only be defined in relation to the market in which it is 
supposed to operate. This is what Coase (1937) established. But Coase stopped short of 
concluding that with that relation constantly changing also the firm would become a loosely 
structured entity that would hardly be manageable as a hierarchy. The management teacher as 
well as the economic theorist needs a realistic model of the firm to support teaching and 
thinking. Since no realistic theory of dynamic markets, distributed production and 
endogenously changing hierarchical structures exists no good theory of the firm has been 
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Table 1. The three Information Paradoxes 
A. INFORMATION PARADOX I 
 
Are we growing relatively less informed because the stock of knowledge we can know 
about is growing faster than we can learn?  
 
Source: Eliasson, G., 1990. The Knowledge Based Information Economy; IUI and Swedish 
Telecon. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell, 1990, pp. 46f.  
 
B.  INFORMATION PARADOX II 
 
Are we becoming less and less informed about what is becoming more and more 
important?  
Source: Eliasson, G., 1990, The Knowledge Based Information Economy, IUI, Telecon, 
Stockholm, p. 16. 
 
C.  INFORMATION PARADOX III 
Are we moving from a knowledge based information economy towards a misinformation 
society? 
Source: Eliasson, G, 1990, The Knowledge Based Information Economy, IUI, Telecon, 
Stockholm, p. 34f.   
   27
Table 2.    The statistical accounts of the knowledge-based information economy 
   Innovation 
 (exploring and expanding state space) 
Creating Business Opportunities 
– customer interaction 
– innovation 
–  experiments 
– technical development 
 
2     Choice and selection 
(identifying business opportunities) 
Economic Filtering and 
Allocation 
– entrepreneurship/entry 
– venture capitalism 
– exit 
–  mobility/flexibility 
–  varied careers 
 
3    Coordination Disciplining 
– competition (in markets) 








– receiver competence 
 
 
Source: Modified version of Eliasson, G., Technological Competition and Trade in the 




Table 3.   Competence specification of the experimentally organized firm 
Orientation 
1. Sense of direction (business intuition) 
2. Management of uncertainty (Risk Willingness)   28
Selection 
3. Efficient identification of mistakes 
4. Effective correction of mistakes 
Operation 
5. Efficient coordination 
6. Efficient learning feedback to (1) 
Source: Eliasson, G. 1996. Firm Objectives, Controls and Organization – the use of information 
and the transfer of knowledge within the firm. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, p. 56. 
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Table 4A.  The dominant selection problem 
Error Type I: Losers kept too long 
Error Type II: Winners rejected 




Table 4B.  Actors in the competence bloc 
1. Competent and active customers 
2. Innovators who integrate technologies in new ways 
3. Entrepreneurs who identify profitable innovations 
4. Competent venture capitalists who recognize and finance the entrepreneurs   
5. Exit markets that facilitate ownership change 
6. Industrialists who take successful innovations to industrial scale production  
Source: G. Eliasson - Å. Eliasson, 1996. ”The Biotechnological Competence Bloc”, Revue 
d’Economie Industrielle, 78-4
0, Trimestre. 
 